90. Edge Case Wisdom

[Lars Peter Nissen] (0:52 - 2:25)

This week's guest on Trumanitarian is David Galbraith. He is a designer and an entrepreneur, originally trained as an architect. And he has one of the most original brains I know. David and I know each other because our kids play football together. And as we stood watching them play, we tended to drift into very interesting conversations. And I was really happy that I was able to get David to come on the show, because even though he's not a humanitarian, I think he has an incredibly interesting perspective that can help us think out of the box, as you will hear, in terms of how we move forward. Before you listen, I'd like to advise you to go to the show notes and click on the link to a blog post David wrote on how to respond to legal threats with cute animal pictures. It's a hilarious post and will give you a bit of a sense of who David is and how he actually moves in the world. And I'm sure you will enjoy that. Once you've listened, as always, make some noise on social media, share this show and episode with other people you think might be interested. And if you have ideas for guests or want to give us some feedback, please don't hold back. Write to us on info@trumanitarian.org. We love hearing from you. As always, most importantly, enjoy the conversation. David Galbraith, welcome to Trumanitarian.

[David Galbraith] (2:26 - 2:27)

Thank you. Thank you for having me.

[Lars Peter Nissen] (2:27 - 3:20)

We know each other because our sons played football together. They were at times more interested in picking flowers on the field rather than playing ball. And I must admit with a bit of shame that, just like our sons got diverted, I think that you and I, supposedly the grown-ups, also had a tendency to drift off in our own very interesting conversations and maybe forget about the kids a little bit. But we are here not to talk about the quality of our parenting, but to discuss the relationship between technology and crisis and how technology, on one hand, can create and drive crisis, but on the other hand, also can be the solution to how we govern and respond to crisis. To get us started, it would be great if you could introduce yourself and tell us a bit about your background.

[David Galbraith] (3:21 - 4:28)

So my background, in terms of worldview, is a bit like watching my son play football, where, as we were just chatting before this, he never put the ball in the net because he wasn't really interested in zero-sum games, and neither am I, to be honest. I've always been interested in things where everyone wins and you can make things. And so I would say I'm a creative person that has good and bad things, and I trained as an architect, qualified as an architect, then became a set designer for rock concert sets, all things, and then pivoted to doing event design and subsequently just got embroiled in the internet. My dad was a physicist, he knew how to program, I knew how to program, and so I did a bunch of tech startups in America and then came back to Europe and became a venture capitalist. And then now I've sort of pivoted away from that because as soon as I sort of checked GPT, it was like the moment when I saw the web browser for the first time, I thought the next 10 years of my life are going to revolve around this. That's what I'm interested in, the impact of AI on the world and what can we do about it.

[Lars Peter Nissen] (4:28 - 4:52)

You've spent most of your career in the tech sector, but you've lived here in Geneva for quite a while and have had a few touch points with, for example, the PORT, a humanitarian innovation platform at CERN, and you and I have also interacted over the years. What is your perspective on the humanitarian sector, on humanitarian action, and on crisis management?

[David Galbraith] (4:52 - 6:04)

So in terms of what you mentioned about crises, I know nothing about humanitarian crises or how they operate or how we deal with them, but I do know that there are two things which will create crises that are to do with technology. And the first is we saw the industrial era was divorced from nature and didn't understand natural systems and we've damaged them. But I don't think we should go backwards to the agrarian period and die at a very early age or sit in a cave around a candle, that we need to progress forward. And I'm hoping that we can progress forward to a type of technology that's much, that understands nature. And I think we have to do that as a species. So that's the environment that creates crises on that level. And then the second one is the virtual environment that creates crises, which we're seeing. I grew up in the utopian period of the internet where we thought getting people to talk was going to be a purely positive thing. And now we're seeing that we've rewired society and the backlash against that is the root cause of a lot of crises, I think, on the human scale rather than the environmental scale.

[Lars Peter Nissen] (6:04 - 6:23)

So we messed up the natural world and that has created climate change, obviously. And we will be heavily impacted by that in the decades to come. And we've messed up the virtual world and that has created teenage depression, political polarization, conspiracy theories, and all sorts of other good things.

[David Galbraith] (6:24 - 6:47)

Yeah. And when I say virtual world, I mean the cultural world. If we talk about the ecosphere, there's, I think, someone had a word for it there. Whatever the sphere is of intellectual debate, talking, communication, this used to happen offline. And now that it's gone online, it's been rewired. And it's been rewired in a way we didn't evolve to deal with, and that creates conflict.

[Lars Peter Nissen] (6:48 - 6:55)

What are the trends you see right now with respect to this generation of crises from the virtual world?

[David Galbraith] (6:55 - 8:12)

So I think there are some signs of how we can fix it. So for the infosphere, I think, was now found the term for the cultural world. We know that the types of networks that the world settled into after the invention of the printing press, which had a similar effect on reconfiguring the way humans communicate, and created the Reformation, and created 200 years of war, et cetera. We know that this rewiring, which is an even bigger structural difference than being the printing press, if you like, delivered a few to many. Now we're talking about many to many. Everyone has a broadcast channel. And we know from all sorts of empirical evidence that there are specific topologies of the way people communicate that are stable. And it's called a small world network. And that's basically where the tribes, the groups, the identities of which we now can belong to many of these, aren't too networked. That there are basically peacemakers, brokers, people who are members of both tribes that are the weak links between these. And that, I think, is a stable configuration that society will settle into automatically. And I hope it won't take too long.

[Lars Peter Nissen] (8:13 - 8:25)

But what does that look like, David? Right now, we can all speak to each other on social media, and we can post our jokes, and our memes, and everybody clap their hands. But what does that small network world look like, concretely?

[David Galbraith] (8:25 - 8:42)

It means that people stay in their bubble a lot of the time, to be honest. And people can move into those bubbles if they like. But it's not like Twitter was the worst example of everyone being in the town square, if you like. And so, instead of it being the town square, it's a series of coffee shops.

[Lars Peter Nissen] (8:42 - 8:47)

And what do those coffee shops look like? What are the platforms we're talking about?

[David Galbraith] (8:47 - 9:12)

Reddit is more like that, for example, than Twitter. I'm not saying that Reddit isn't toxic. There are lots of hugely toxic areas in Reddit and huge wars. But Reddit is probably too disconnected. The sweet spot, the Goldilocks network, the small world is where you have the communities, basically. And they're open communities. You can move between them. But they're not all in the town square, all at once, all shouting at each other.

[Lars Peter Nissen] (9:13 - 9:19)

And do you see the kids moving to those platforms? Aren't they on TikTok, and Instagram, and Snapchat?

So, they are in some ways. I mean, most of us will have experience on WhatsApp. During COVID, we set up several groups, and they've persisted between groups of friends. We had, like, my old school friends, or the one where we would go for a drink once a week in where we live. And these things persist and actually spend more time on those group chats now than do in the town square. I use Twitter, for example, purely to talk about work things. I stay off politics. I stay off anything like that, because it just will be misunderstood, or it's not constructive. So, I talk purely about work things.

And you see this move to smaller, more intimate tribal communities as something positive.

We are a tribal species with irrational beliefs. That's the nature. And this is a very dangerous combination when you start messing with the way we interact and communicate. And so, the only way we can communicate is if we can move between tribes. And the tribes can be loose things. It can be what football team you support, what music you like. But people care about these things, and they start arguing about them. People went to war over a football match in the 70s.

Yes, I believe it was El Salvador and Honduras that went a bit offside on that one. But cool, I get it. I hope you're right in terms of how small world networks will dampen some of the negative effects we've seen from social media. But at the same time, when I look at the challenges we face with the natural world, with climate change, then I can't help thinking, how the heck are we ever going to get collaboration at the scale we need it together if we are in a world of small networks? How are we going to do that?

So, I don't think it can happen through global cooperation because that doesn't spread virally. It requires everyone to reach agreement. I think the only way we can solve it is through tariffs. And doing what the European Union is, one of the better things we're doing is the first tariff that is not just a carbon tariff on goods produced, but goods imported as well. And so that creates a level playing field, given that we have one planet, it should be a universal tariff system. The benefit of tariffs is they create a sort of tip for tap series of reprisal and they spread virally. And so, yes, they cause inflation. Yes, they do all sorts of other things, but we're probably in a world where we should have some degree of carbon tariffs. And then incentivization then for renewables. So, that's one aspect of how do you, in absence of communication, get something that automatically aligns interests. The second thing is that natural systems are computationally irreducible. So, we know that, for example, that they're complex systems and complex has a very specific meaning. A watch is not a complex system. You can write an equation and figure out what the time will be in 12 hours from now. With three planets revolving around each other, you cannot create an equation that does that. You have to calculate it. You have to feed the equation back into its own results. So, that's what we mean by complex system. That's what we mean by computationally irreducible. And that's why to understand natural systems, because they are all complex, we need to compute them. And what I mean by that is we need a supercomputer to calculate what the weather's going to be in three days from now. If we're going to solve climate change, we do need massive amounts of computation and we need massive amounts of clean energy to power that.

Yes. So, I think I get that. But I mean, to be fully honest, I'm never quite sure whether I fully get what you think. But I think I get the gist of it. But what I don't see is the governance aspect of things. Because I think we have a very deep crisis with global governance. And I think you saw that very clearly during COVID, the way vaccines were harked by the most affluent countries and not distributed in a good way. And so, I hear you. Fine that we can sit in our little tribal worlds and find that we can impose some kind of tariffs to change the incentives. But how do we actually govern this? And how do we come to some kind of consensus about what we do?

So, I'm saying that there are two types of governance. One is the reaching agreement, that is active governance. And the other is to create the rules that automatically align interests.

And they're the ones that I sort of favor, because I think they're more efficient. And so, aligning self interests for a goal that's perceived to be beneficial to all is a more efficient way of achieving governance. But do you see that happening these days? Well, I'm saying that the tariffs one would be an example of that. It seems like a hostile thing to do, but I actually think it ends up being something that plays out and for the greater good.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we built up this humanitarian system that in some shape or form serves the most vulnerable populations in crisis. And we have tried to do that at a global level. And it feels like the consensus that that sort of a universalist approach to humanitarian action is over or being undermined at least. Now, how do you see the possibility to build up some sort of governance for these crises? I don't think you can solve this with tariffs, right? So, in other words, how do we mobilize solidarity with crisis affected populations in today's world?

So, that's a massive question. So, going back to what you described the state of the world today, yes, Pax Americana looks like a period that may be over, that we're in a multipolar world. And hopefully, we're not in a destabilized world that's just chaos, that the new poles achieve some sort of stable equilibrium, if you like, and that that stable equilibrium will determine what the people in orbit around those poles achieve their own stability. Whether, let's say, Belt and Road initiatives from China, whether it's what we mean by the EU, I mean, there are three states of the former Soviet Union that are part of the EU, not just Soviet and not just Eastern Bloc states, but actual Soviet states. So, the EU, in terms of the longer period of history, the EU and Russia are now in conflict, I think, obviously. And we see that places like that, I think maybe the Ukraine's a red herring in the sense that the real issue would be, let's say, Kaliningrad and Lithuania, for example. So, to answer your point about how things operate in this new world is they need to reach a stable equilibrium so that we know where the senses of power are and who are the people that are then responsible, probably, for tempering that power or leveraging it for good.

One of the things I've been trying to think through that I find really difficult to make fit in my head is, is this business of, on one side, an extreme concentration of power, right? We seem to concentrate more and more wealth in fewer and fewer hands, you have tech companies dominating more and more, no?

Look, if you look on a global scale, more people have been lifted out of poverty than any period in history. What's happened is that within developing countries, which were, the inequality has widened because they've become, they operate on a global scale. So, London, for example, is much more like a city state of the Renaissance era than it is like the capital of a country, which is why people in the northeast of England ended up voting for Brexit. This was, this is basically a, the people who wanted to preserve the nation state rebelled against the people who are benefiting from the city state. And obviously, ordinary poor people got caught up in this power dynamic between nationalism and globalism. And that's played out in many other places. So, I think on a global scale, I think inequality has probably reduced. Massively, if you look at the number of people in poverty in global terms over the past generation, massive reduction. But there have been pockets of people that were used to being part of the middle class and seeing the middle class being hollowed out in a lot of Western countries, for example.

One of the things that I've been trying to get to fit in my head, and not very successfully so, is that on one side, we see a tendency towards an extreme concentration of power in fewer and fewer hands.

Well, what's happening naturally is that in the city state era, the city states had their own domains and they weren't part of the country. And so, you could see, for example, I'm Scottish, you could totally see, I'm against Scottish independence, but unless it was part of a bigger collection. So, if we had, I'm digressing, if we had something like the Hanseatic League, you know, collections of independent states, but there's a different configuration of what it means to be a country. And the nation state is a relatively recent phenomenon. Certainly in the West, China, different story. But the nation state in Europe was a recent thing. It was a late 18th and 19th century.

Maybe what I'm trying to say is that in all your talk about the small world networks and and the way these small worlds are more stable than the over-connected, big social polarizing network we have experienced over the past decades. If we cannot create solidarity between London and the north of England, how the heck are we ever going to be able to do it at a global level?

The old world, the industrial world is over. The digital era is as equivalent a change to the industrial versus agrarian period. And AI has now taken it to a different level. AI is not a next phase of the web. It's not web three or whatever people are talking about. They'll never have it. AI is the equivalent of the web itself. It's a transformational thing. That means that whatever that state, given that these things exist, our current institutions, our current configuration of tribes of states, virtually, non-virtually, physically, whatever, they are all largely obsolete. And so they need to change. And obviously changing institutions takes a long time. And so that's why we're seeing, for example, France and Germany in trouble at the moment, because they were very well built states for the industrial era, the late industrial era. And they're crystallized into that form. And unfortunately, the model that they were created around doesn't exist anymore, doesn't work. So you're seeing increasing strains on the core of Europe, not the periphery. And which is why, by the way, my recent talking about Europe's problems are not because I don't believe in Europe. It's precisely because I do believe in Europe, because I think Europe was a system which rewarded endeavor and didn't punish bad luck.

Again, I think what I'm looking for and trying to understand is how we can mobilize a coalition of actors to deal with the problems and the crises coming our way. And I don't see that. And I don't really hear that in what you're saying.

So I think we tend, as human beings, we tend to look at the wrong way through the telescope. We look at the African savannah and we see the animals in it. We don't look at the African savannah. And I'm saying the environment is what actually dictates what happens to the animals within it. And it's the environment we should focus on in terms of the dynamics of what creates a stable system, not the individual actors. Because then if you get the right configuration of institutions and rules and interactions and incentives, they will automatically become a stable equilibrium. And that's what we need. We're in that period. We are in a period where we've moved out of one trough and we're on the hill and it could roll either way. And we're very unstable. We need to fall back into stable traffic.

I guess I'm looking for some lights at the end of the tunnel here, David. You tell me AI is part of the solution and that we need computational power to fully understand climate change and be able to combat it. And I get that, but I am a bit scared of AI. I think it can do a lot of harm. I think it can scale many of the negative effects we've seen from the internet and take it to a totally new level. But maybe I'm too much of a Luddite here.

So this is where I would say, paradoxically, I'm the optimist in the sense of this.

And I think we need to say that that is a first in our relationship. I am the optimist. And your glass is always half empty.

So everyone thinks I'm grumpy, miserable. But I would say I've always been involved in technology and the future because I do think the future can be better. I do think we live longer, less children die in childhood. We have clean water. We have enough food to eat. We have seen the end of scarcity for a lot of things. But obviously, there are terrible things in a period of change. And so what I'm saying is, if we can get through this period of change, then the future is brighter. And it will be. And that's why I'm saying we can't put AI back in the box. AI will help us move forward and have a brighter future. It will. It will have all sorts of horrible secondary effects like anything. But you can't wind things back. I do believe in human progress and wisdom. And I think the goal is not to make money. It's not GDP. The goal is libraries, books, knowledge, wisdom. That's what growth looks like. But I do believe in growth of knowledge.

So let's imagine that you were hired by the humanitarian sector collectively to help us become fit for the future. What would your three pieces of advice be for us?

So there are tactical things and strategic things.

Let's take some tactical things first and then go to the strategic after.

Tactical things is, well, it's a great opportunity for people who've been disadvantaged in some areas to leap forward. Remote work. And there's a whole series of remote work. There are a whole series of jobs that are going to go away. They are. But it means that there are a whole load of new opportunities. And embracing those new opportunities is something that can probably be done remotely. We now have global broadband internet. We now have the ability for people to execute on tasks that are very human, for example, or very creative. The problem with AI is a very simple one. You sit in front of a box that you can ask it anything and no one knows what to ask it. So creative people can come up with ideas of things it can do. I think these are things that favor, they create a level playing field now for people to come in and basically be able to leverage these tools and do new things. So that's a very tactical, I would say, specific thing.

And we actually had a really good example of that here on the show. It's a startup called Equal Reach, which is essentially a platform for geek work for refugees so that people on the move who otherwise are excluded from the economy have a possibility to earn a living.

Look, and the downside of that is you're seeing, let's say, the price of rents going up in Athens from, like, in theory, this sort of favors the disadvantaged. In reality, obviously, you end up with an elite sort of middle class that now move to places with nice climates and then put the rents up in, for instance, rents in Athens are up a lot. And global nomads, they're a tiny percentage of that, but they are having a small effect. And I suspect we're going to see that what happened with gentrification of areas, you're going to see this sort of global gentrification by global nomads. And that will have negative effects, for example. And it will often be dressed up, let's say, in opportunities for disadvantaged people. And actually, it won't end up being that. So I think we should be careful about some of that stuff. But if we are very specific on them, we could align the incentives to make sure that they don't get captured by the people who are basically already quite wealthy.

Are there tactical things we should be focused on?

I don't know. I mean, I'm sure there are lots and lots, but I don't know. I don't know enough about humanitarian organizations, but I'm sure there are. I'll give you one example of where I think it can have an enormous tactical benefit is a friend of mine had a 200-year-old business selling muslim cloth in the east end of London. And the interest rates went up and he wanted a new bank account to get new interest rates. And so the bank wanted to do the business plan. He's like, well, it's a 200-year-old business. We're not going to do anything different. And so eventually, he just got ChatGBT to do it, printed it out, put it in an envelope, didn't even read it, and sent it to the bank who accepted it. And so what that was an example of was a level playing field in terms of bureaucracy. And I think bureaucracy often is used to actually against disadvantaged people, as he was voting in the US, for example. And I think now AI is able to create a level playing field in terms of bureaucracy and dealing with it. Because AI, paradoxically, at the moment, is good at mediocre things. And most bureaucracy just requires mediocre answers. But it's very intimidating for people who often... And so I think we'll see some very beneficial effects, actually, in terms of being able to do things without forms. That's really interesting.

If we then look at the strategic level, what do we as humanitarians need to do to be fit for the future?

So I think the organizations will be structurally different. But the internet meant that things had bottom-up communication channels, i.e. that they looked like a network more than a hierarchy. And industrial-age things were very hierarchical and rigid and very inorganic-looking, unorganic-looking. That was an internet effect, where suddenly the person at the bottom of a pyramid can talk to the person at the top, so actually it's not a pyramid. I think we'll see clusters of teams. We'll see different organizational structures. But that was already a case of the internet. So the question is, what does AI do that's different? I think what AI does that's different is that example I just gave about deleting bureaucracy is all large organizations have... Look, you need structure, but you also need flow of information. So there are forces that go against each other. You need freedom and structure. And I see that with the humanitarian people that I've met is that I was always amazed by these people that have just unbelievable human experiences and therefore edge-case wisdom about things. And if that can be captured in an organizational structure that doesn't block the flow or those opinions, I think what AI does is it's almost like when you put maggots on a wound and it eats the bad flesh, that I think the mediocre AI, this bureaucracy-deleting nature of it, once you infect an organization with it, it actually will clean it up, and it will make it more efficient, and it will allow people to actually not have to spend their time filling in forms.

Edge-case wisdom is probably one of the best descriptions, one of the most precise descriptions I've heard of the humanitarian skillset, sort of the essence of the humanitarian skillset. There are essentially two things that really concerns me with AI. On one side, it is that AI is built on existing knowledge, and that we know that the people we work with are some of the most marginalized, and that they don't have very loud voices. Just like medicine traditionally has been all about men's health as opposed to women's health, I worry that we're baking in a wide range of serious biases that'll work against the marginalized.

So I think a lot of the attempts to remove bias have introduced other forms of bias, and have been very naive and very simplistic. I think that if we take a healthcare example to illustrate what bias is, overnight we saw in America mask-wearing versus not wearing a mask become a political stance. There was no nuance. There was no like, well, sometimes you need to wear a mask and sometimes you don't. It was almost like, if you wore a mask, you were tribally affiliated with the left, and if you didn't wear one, you were tribally affiliated with the right. And this was so depressing seeing this thing instantly become political. So a bias there, or attempt to remove bias, how do you introduce nuance into that? You want both of those things. So removing bias shouldn't be about removing one thing or the other. It should be about creating nuance and creating discussion. I think a lot of the attempts to remove bias have actually just been forcing something into one camp versus the other, and actually then introduce a new form of bias. I think I agree with that.

But when I look at AI, I don't see it introducing nuance, do you? No, it doesn't. That's what I'm saying. But I think some of the reduced nuance is A, to do with the training set being human beings, and B, to do with the attempts to produce safety guidelines that are just way too simplistic.

Another thing that worries me about AI is that, I mean, we're dealing, as you say, with edge cases here. We're dealing with black swans. And so do you really want an AI to help you out in that case? I mean, let's imagine we had had AI in a big way during COVID. Would it really have been able to tell us anything useful, or would it have started hallucinating and taking us down some rabbit hole?

One thing there is that's a good thing. That means that humans still have a role with their edge cases, if that's true. Secondly, I think it's changing over time. I think the structure of AI is becoming more complicated, and they are capable of introducing something new from what already exists. Some evidence is not completely true. So we don't know yet. I think the jury is still out.

So I guess the main message I'm hearing from you, David, is that we're in a bit of a shithole right now. Things are sort of falling apart in a big way, and eventually it will get better. But during the transition, things can actually go really, really wrong. And I don't hear a lot of answers from you in terms of how we can reach out and help some of the most vulnerable people in the world.

Well, I'm saying two things. One, that future that is brighter will be one where we are more in contact with nature, where we understand our environment, or, frankly, we're going to be extinct. So that would be a much nicer view of the world than the industrial one. It would have all of the benefits of scientific progress with none of the sort of alienating downsides of it that we've seen in the last 150 years. So that's on one side. On the other side, we can see a way that we can actually talk to each other as people across the world. It's not wholly bad. This is the original utopian idea of the internet. Once we create a new stable equilibrium politically, I suspect also it will be much more decentralized and fractal and benefit some of those areas in the world that had massive straight lines drawn across thousands of miles, that had no relationship with what was going on in the ground in terms of identity or culture. And so I think that that much more organic, fractal, decentralized model of the world will be the political equilibrium that we will reach, and that will actually favor a lot of disadvantaged parts of the world as a result of, let's say, colonialism.

Maybe a last question for you, David. What are the three ideas that you are pushing today to speed up this transition towards the new equilibrium?

So I wrote a paper called Forward to Nature with the grandson of Robert Oppenheimer, who is focused on renewable energy. And that was basically a thesis showing provably the science of how progress works in terms of abundant computation and abundant energy. I have also been trying to show that what happens now economically is very different with AI.

There have been, if you like, the Microsoft era of competing reduced the marginal cost of production, i.e. you created a new CD with Windows on it, and it costs you no more to create the second CD than the first one. And then we had the internet, which reduced the cost of distribution to zero for the marketing and sales and replaced enterprise sales for itself. Now we're seeing with AI the actual cost of production, i.e. not the cost of printing a new CD of Windows, but the cost of producing Windows in the first place dropped to zero. The cost of producing software is dropping to zero. The cost of production is dropping to zero. Now, given that we're talking about the industrial, the post-industrial information age era, we're now in an information age era where the cost of production drops to zero. This is a fundamentally different economic model from anything we've seen. And this is why what we're seeing is all of the venture capitalists, for example, that have invested in AI companies are doing exactly the wrong thing, because what AI does is it kills AI companies. It's big AI versus little AI. What AI does is it generates value at the backend, at the infrastructure end. And so the thing that I'm interested in now is that backend, that infrastructure end will have massive opportunities that I think will trigger the Internet of Energy. And the Internet of Energy will be what solves some of the problems. The grid, if you like, is an industrial era structure. And I think we need to have a new type of grid. So that's the backend. On the front end, venture capital meant that you had to either be a massive company or you died. And it didn't favor small businesses and people doing interesting creative things, which we typically call agencies. They actually have clients and they make money. AI favors creative people and reduces the cost of software production to zero. So you can actually have a lot of small businesses that can actually do some quite interesting things or departments within organizations.

So what you're saying actually is that as the backend of AI strengthens, the front end will actually increasingly support the small world networks that you described earlier in our conversation. Yes. Yes. David Galbraith, thank you so much for coming on Trumanitarian. It's always a pleasure. And I think maybe now it's time to go and watch our kids play some football.

Yes.

Thank you.