22. The Collaborative Contrarian

Lars Peter Nissen: 00:12

Adelina Kamal describes herself as a collaborative contrarian. I just think of her as a humanitarian. She is the executive director of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management, or simply just the AHA Centre, which is based in Jakarta, Indonesia. Adelina and I first met in 2OO8 during cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, one of the operations that inspired the creation of the AHA centre. I found the conversation fascinating in the sense that all of the challenges that Adelina bring up exactly the same that we struggle with at the global level, but the answers she brings to the table have a different flavour to them. And it is that complementarity that I think really makes the AHA Centre unique and an important part of the discussion in terms of where we are going as a sector and how we come to terms with the fact that one size fits nothing, but that we need to have... but we need to have contextually adapted solutions for different settings. We speak exclusively on natural disasters and the role of a AHA in this setting and as such, we have chosen not to discuss some of the complex humanitarian crisis which also are taking place in the region. I hope you enjoy this conversation as much as I did.

Adelina Kamal, welcome to Trumanitaran.

Adelina Kamal: 01:41

Thank you for having me.

Lars Peter Nissen: 01:43

You're the executive director of the AHA centre. Now what does that stand for? What is the AHA centre?

Adelina Kamal: 01:51

AHA Centre has a long name. Is a negotiated name. AHA Centre stands for the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management. But if you must remember one thing, AHA can also stand for ASEAN help ASEAN.

Lars Peter Nissen: 02:11

So it sounds a little bit to me like an ASEAN version of OCHA. Is that a good way to describe it?

Adelina Kamal: 02:17

Well, actually, it's a little bit of many things. It's not only OCHA element there, is also WFP a bit, is also Red Cross a bit, is also some other UN agencies a bit, it's also the local CSO. So we have bits and pieces of the current humanitarian actors but it's an intergovernmental organisation, is a regional... is a specialised regional centre, set up by the 10 ASEAN countries, and focuses on basically strengthening the national capacities of the 10 ASEAN countries to respond collectively to disasters, and also to collaborate with one another in reducing risks. As you know, ASEAN region is also known as the supermarket of disaster, or the 7-Eleven of disaster. But that is something that we want to change, yeah? It's not a good thing to be remembered as the 7-Eleven and supermarket disaster. We want we want to be also known as the region that is self-sufficient, and the countries that are reliant on ourselves.

Lars Peter Nissen: 03:29

I love that 7-Eleven bit. I had never heard that before. But tell me, I believe all of the ASEAN countries are also members of the UN, right? And so how come we need the AHA Centre in addition to the entire UN setup on humanitarian affairs? What's your value added?

Adelina Kamal: 03:49

Um, well, first of all, AHA Centre was established also out of necessity, yeah? We... AHA centre was shaped by three catastrophic disasters in the ASEAN region. You remember the 2OO4 Indian Ocean tsunami that effected that the ASEAN areas, of Indonesia and also Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, right? There are four countries in ASEAN, and also the surrounding countries. And then AHA Centre was also shaped by the 2OOO Cyclone Nargis our experience from Cyclone Nargis. We met there, in Myanmar, last the first time. AHA centre was born about two-three years later in 2O11. And then there was this another major disaster, Typhoon Haiyan in 2O13. AHA Centre was just two years old. We were also kind of like shaped by this disaster in the Philippines. So it AHA Centre was born out of necessity, because of the catastrophic disasters and because the 10 ASEAN countries felt that it is time for them to do something, you know, more concrete about helping one another. There was actually this declaration, back then in 76, nineteen seventy-six (ASEAN was established in nineteen sixty-seven, as old as my husband)... Yeah [laughing], but there was this declaration. There was this declaration, the Declaration on Mutual Assistance and Natural Disaster, dated 76 and signed by the five founding fathers. Only two pages. Right? So before the tsunami, the 10 ASEAN countries already had an idea of, Okay, what are we going to do but this declaration, only two page and signed only by the five founding fathers of ASEAN, now we are 10. Okay, so... And at that time, there was of course, no tsunami yet, but we had landslides, we had flooding, you know, we have the so-called medium scale disaster, and we wanted to do more than this two page declaration of intent. And we talk about, Okay, I think we need to see whether we can mobilise resources across borders to help one another, we have this search and rescue teams, and so on and so forth. That that was actually the discussion before the Indian Ocean tsunami, and no one of course knew that the tsunami, you know, what happened nine months later, in December 2OO4. So really, AHA Centre was established out of the necessity. I was in the negotiation table. So after the Indian Ocean tsunami, we further crystallised this intention to help one another to expand this two page declaration of intent into a regional treaty. And then we also kind of like we said, Okay, it's not going to be only about response, it's also going to be about reducing risks. And then, you know, some countries got decided, Okay, well, you know, when we talk about disaster as big as tsunami, we cannot just meet once in a while, guys, right? And we talking about the 10 national disaster management organisation, they at that time, they met quite frequently, but only like twice in a year. But they said that, Okay, we cannot do the way we do things. We need full-timers, we need AHA Centre. Okay, so Indonesia came up with the idea of AHA Centre, ASEAN Humanitarian Agency ASEAN Humanitarian centre, basically, that's the original name. And then the other countries liked the idea and then there you go. Then the idea of AHA Centre came into this negotiated tax and then out of this regional treaty called the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response then... which is our Bible, yeah? When it comes to disaster management, that is our Bible, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response. So in that Bible, article 19, of the bible [laughing]... article 19, AHA Centre... the idea of AHA Centre was created. So really, it was born out of necessity. Because we were so afraid. I was in that negotiating table, we kind of like negotiated the agreement, it was one of the fastest negotiated agreement in the region, negotiated only four months after the Indian Ocean tsunami. Just imagine 10 countries negotiating an agreement together, and to be able to conclude that within four months.That's amazing, right? But you know, there's this one thing in our mind, we don't want another tsunami. We're so afraid of another tsunami. So therefore, you know, we were able to conclude the agreement within four months. And really, you know, when people said, Okay, how AHA Centre was born? Well, for sure, AHA Centre was not born out of, you know, the sky... falling from the sky down to the earth. No, it was born out of the necessity, because we were so afraid of another tsunami, because we wanted to make sure that we will be more prepared when there is another catastrophic disaster. Enough is enough. That's... yeah, that's what we said. That's what the 10 ASEAN countries said. I was at the ASEAN Secretariat at the time, of course, AHA Centre was not yet born, but you know, I'm one of those people who had the privilege of witnessing how AHA Centre was born and then somehow then I got to lead the AHA Centre as well in 2O17 after I left the ASEAN Secretariat. Yeah. So that's the story of AHA Centre.

Lars Peter Nissen: 09:52

So clearly it is the political will in the immediate aftermath of these terrible disasters that means you can fast-track and intergovernmental process the way you describe it. Now, what does it...

Adelina Kamal: 10:04

It's a combination. It's a combination, Lars. It's a combination of political with will as well as the operational drive of the national disaster management organisation. Operational drive, why? Because... I told you earlier, right, that a few months before the tsunami, we already talked about mobilising resources across border, you know, helping one another, and so on so forth. And that political operational drive came from the NDMOs, the 10, national disaster management organisations of the 10 ASEAN countries. Right? But it was combined. Also, you're right with the political will. And that political will came from the ASEAN leaders, because when the tsunami happened in December 2OO4, they knew that the disaster management agencies of the 10 ASEAN countries already talked about, you know, having this framework, right. And then the leader said, Okay, do it, but do it faster, not one year, but within just few months, we want to have it done as soon as possible. And not long after the Indian Ocean tsunami, we even had the special ASEAN summit in Jakarta, two weeks after the tsunami, and it was kind of like, you know, articulated in that special ASEAN Summit, Kofi Annan was there, you know, the leaders of the world were there together with the ASEAN leaders, and the idea of establishing a high centre and operationalizing the this bible of ASEAN, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management, were mentioned in that special ASEAN tsunami summit here. So it's a combination of a political will and operational drive.

Lars Peter Nissen: 11:52

And now describe for us the institution that comes out of this operational will to collaborate across borders, combined with a political momentum. How many people are you? Do come from all of the ASEAN countries? What do you do?

Adelina Kamal: 12:08

So we are 10 years old. We were established in November 2O11. So it took a while to establish the Centre because it was born out of an agreement and for the agreement, it requires all the 10 ASEAN countries to basically ratify the agreement. So the agreement only got ratified in December 2OO9. So the process of establishing the centre only started in 2O1O. So only in 2O11, we got established. Anyway, we're going to celebrate our 10-year anniversary. This coming November is going to be a decade for the AHA Centre. Right now we're about 50 people, so quite small, but I also do not envision AHA Centre to be a large organisation because it's a coordinating centre. And there is meaning to our name, right? It is named as the coordinating centre not an ASEAN centre because we are not meant to replace the national government. We are coordinating Centre, we are facilitating cooperation and coordination among the 10 ASEAN countries. Were created by the ASEAN countries for ASEAN countries. So if we are... if we become too big, then we will not be agile and flexible and nimble. So I think 50 is quite a good number. And in fact, we have grown from just one person, that's the first executive director of the AHA Centre, to 13, to about like, I think 20, and now 50. And during my term with the centre, the second part of the decade, right, because I became the ED in 2O17, we actually tripled our size from 13 to 50. Who is AHA Centre? As we are entering into, you know, this decade, 10 years old, 10 years of AHA Centre, I often reflect who we are, what kind of animal we are, and I think we are this contrarian animal. Yeah, but it's not just a regular contrarian animal, right? Okay, perhaps animal is not the right word. But we are a contrarian. I think.

Lars Peter Nissen: 14:59

So, in which sense are you a contrarian? And what is it you're reacting to?

Adelina Kamal: 15:05

Um, well we are contrarian because of... because the reason why we were established. One, out of necessity, right? The three catastrophic disasters that I mentioned earlier, the... firstover the Indian Ocean tsunami. It was the Indian Ocean tsunami that created another tsunami, right? We call it the "tsunami of assistance" the second wave of tsunami. And, you know, in Indonesia, in particular, and also in other countries, we don't want that to happen anymore. It's just too much. And it's not easy, you know, to receive assistance. It's more difficult to receive assistance, then to offer a assistance. So what happened was, during the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Indonesia opened up the gate, and, you know, everybody could come in. And it was the second wave of tsunami. So then, you know, as part of the notion, the lessons learned, we need basically to strengthen our national resilience, right? We we needed to manage ourselves so that we can manage the disasters next time. Doesn't have to be, you know, like that anymore. And therefore, we need to increase our self-resilience. The way I say it's a contrarian, because it's creating something, right... AHA Centre itself is a contrarian because AHA Centre was created out of necessity and that necessity was basically making sure that, you know, we're not going to experience that second wave of tsunami. Second, I guess, actually, the one that made us even a stronger contrarian. Because second, I guess, in Myanmar, in 2OO8, the the mainstream approach didn't work. So ASEAN actually had to apply the alternative approach because the mainstream approach didn't work. The International humanitarian system tried right, to basically apply the normal system, but it didn't work. So then ASEAN came and basically introduced this idea of the ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism that that's a contrarian. So it was kind of like shaking the, or challenging, the status quo, because we were kind of like a new kid in the block, right? And then Typhoon Haiyan, also another disaster that make us contrarian because that was the time when the global humanitarian system came in with the go big, regret, regret late approach, as if that the capital was not functioning, as if that the resources were not there in the country.

Lars Peter Nissen: 18:04

It's not bad if we bring a bit of spirituality into a humanitarian discussion. So I think what what you have described so far, for me, is a complementarity that I can see work well in mega disasters. Because as you said, it's so overwhelming, you basically need wherever you can get your hands on. Now, in 2O18, these were more... they weren't small disasters, but they were not mega disasters. And so did that change the role and the division of labour between ASEAN and international response community and the national government

Adelina Kamal: 18:43

2O18 Triple disasters. It's not only tsunami... earthquake and tsunami but also liquefaction that it affected the central Sulawesi province of Indonesia. How many provinces Indonesia? 34. So it's not even considered as a national disaster and central Sulawesi is a province in island of Sulawesi. So it's a provincial level disaster, but it actually reaches the catastrophic level according to our, you know, statistic. So therefore, you know, the people's attention, you know, was geared towards the center. So obviously, it was really unique year because in 2O18, it was not only the central triple disaster, before that, there was this Lombok earthquake, right? And then typhoon Mangkhut in the Philippines, flooding in the Mekong region and, you know, some other disasters were very busy. So, you know, you imagine a country that experiences this disaster, one after another, and they just actually experience Lombok earthquake. So although it was a provincial disaster, it was actually Quite a lot, right for Indonesia. But then... and I'm not speaking on behalf of the Indonesian government, right, but, you know, interpreting what happened. Indonesia decided that they will come international assistance, but then they specified the kind of assistance that they need from the international humanitarian community. If you ask me whether it changed, yes. Why? Because at that time the Indonesian government, unlike, you know, the 2OO4 Indian Ocean Tsunami decided that they, you know, they welcome offer of assistance, they specified what, you know, they need, and then they also decided that, Okay, if you come as an assistance, you need to find local players, right? You cannot just come in with your search and rescue dog, you know, bringing in drones and everything. If you come, you channel your assistance through the local players, such as the Indonesian Red Cross, and then AHA Centre was tasked to help the national disaster management organisation to manage offers of international assistance. Interestingly, you know, AHA Centre, ASEAN, and UN, in particular OCHA already came up with this interoperability playbook. So we also practice that interoperability with the UN in particular. We mobilise our ERAT, this is the version of... the ASEAN version of UNDAC. And then...

Lars Peter Nissen: 21:47

And maybe we should just explain that UNDAC is the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team, and your version of that is called the ERAT.

Adelina Kamal: 21:55

ERAT, yeah, Emergency Responders and Assessment Team. So ERAT was mobilised first upon the acceptance of the Indonesian government. Actually, it was just a few hours after the disaster, they said, Okay, we need ERAT to support managing offers of international assistance also on the ground. We need ERAT on the ground in the staging area. But we also need AHA Centre to manage offers of assistance at the EOC, Emergency Operation Centre, in Jakarta. So at the three levels, at the strategic, operational, tactical level. But then interestingly, Indonesian government decided Okay, it will be ERAT that would take the lead and UNDA will support ERAT. And then it was... there was no OSOCC, the on-site coordination set up of UNOCHA, there was no OSOCC. The Indonesian government decided to set up Jolokia, which is our version of OSOCC, the on-site coordinations set up on the ground, but then they modify it. So they said, Okay, rather than having OSOCC and Jolokia of AHA Centre separately, why don't we just combine it into one that is Jolokia. The joint operation and coordination centre basically is the common posts on the ground, whereby AHA Centre, together with our ERAT from the ten ASEAN countries will work together with the UNDAC supporting the Indonesian government at the national and local level. So the... You know, in short, what actually happened during that time was that national and local leadership, strengthen... enhanced by the regional mechanism, strengthened by international community as and when necessary. That's that's what happens. So it was kind of like beautifully arranged. Somehow we were able to practice what we wrote in the interoperability book between ASEAN, AHA Centre and UNOCHA. But I think it was also due to the fact that the government of Indonesia was pretty clear of what they wanted to get out of the regional player, and that is AHA Centre, and out of the International mechanism, that is the OCHA, UNDA, you know, WFP and the rest. And yeah, that's what happened. Quite interesting. Yeah, quite interesting architecture.

Lars Peter Nissen: 24:39

Adelina, you have seen you've seen many crisis, you've seen many operations. Now, when you look at 2O18 and with this architecture in place, where you describe how first the national level resources are used, supported by the AHA Centre, and then further supported by the International UN system under international civil society, what was the benefit of that setup? What did you do better operationally? Can you point to one or two things where you go, yeah, that really worked better because we did it in this way?

Adelina Kamal: 25:11

We did some kind of a research, yeah? And it was actually studying the the lines of communication the first weeks after the disaster. We compare it with the lines of communication and the interaction during Typhoon Haiyan and then... two weeks after Typhoon Haiyan and two weeks after the 2O18 triple disaster in central Sulawesi. You know, we actually published this research. It was done by some of my colleagues, together with other researchers. It was quite interesting. I think that scheme actually picture that for central Sulawesi, it was less chaotic. The coordination notes were clear. It was really clear for us to see where AHA Centre, where BNPB, the national disaster management organisation, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and where UNOCHA is. These were the four coordination notes that actually kind of like a picture, right, based on this communication lines. And then these lines were actually thick, showing that it was intense coordination. And then there were so many, you know, offers of assistance coming to through AHA Centre. And I just imagine all of this coming direct to the Government of Indonesia. It will be it will be too much for them. And, you know, for Indonesia, right, for the country affected by disaster, it was... right, you just experienced Lombok earthquake. You had to deal with the the disaster in the country. And there are so many national and local stakeholders to deal with. It would be too much to manage this offer of assistence alone. So, you know, we we became... Okay, people said that we became the gatekeeper. But I think no, we basically helped reduce the burden of the Indonesian government. Because, as I said earlier, much more difficult to accept a system that didn't offer a system.

Lars Peter Nissen: 27:47

I think I hear two different stories. One is, oh, you know, then disaster came in, and they were the bottleneck, and we couldn't get all the stuff we wanted to help with out there. Or you could have the other one saying, There is no way that they are just going to throw the second tsunami of help down here as they did in 2OO4. We want to know that what is being flown across the world, actually is needed and required. And so there needs to be a process in place. It's squaring the circle between on one side having to move really quickly, because needs are urgent, on the other hand, having to base those needs on a thorough assessment on what is actually required. And it's also about doing it in an orderly manner so that these... this tsunami of donations that we see come in, especially in the in the mega disasters, doesn't become a problem in themself.

Adelina Kamal: 28:38

I'm trying to like, explain it, but also understand it from the perspective of those, you know, who have this goodwill. It's a goodwill, right, coming from those who want to help and I think we need to respect that. But I think we also need to recognise that we're talking about a country or region that has experience world class disaster over the past 15 years. So there must be some national or local capacity in the country. And for us in ASEAN, solidarity is important. Helping your neighbour is important. That's the.. We are Asian. You know, doing it, you cannot just ignore your neighbour, especially if the neighbour is in trouble. But when you visit your neighbour, you need to have manners as well, right? You cannot visit the patient at the hospital anytime you like, you have to actually follow the rules of the hospital. You cannot just bring all kinds of fresh vegetable and fruit, right, to the patient. You need to also follow you know what can be given that's exactly it right. And yeah, so we're kind of like creating the more predictability, right, into the unpredictable and the chaotic world.

Lars Peter Nissen: 30:04

But of course, here sitting in Geneva, surrounded by a lot of the international actors, there are some of them who would say something along the lines that, yeah, I hear what you're saying, and of course, it's important to have consensus with the government, but we also sometimes have governments who don't take care of all of their populations and there may be an internal conflict, and so if we always have to work through the government, the way that you say, then we won't be able to reach the most vulnerable? How would you confront that sort of...

Adelina Kamal: 30:37

It depends. It depends on the government. If the government is functioning, right, you know, the government has the capacity, and actually, most of the governments in ASEAN do have that capacity, and they actually have gone through the worst in terms of world class disaster, then, you know, then you offer what is needed. It will be a different case, right, if the government is not functioning, or there are some political problems within that government. That... it will have to be on a case by case basis, but it cannot be generalised. The point here is that, you know, respect the sovereignty of the government, respect, and this is not only about, you know, national government, but also respect the capacity within the country. And I think so far the global humanitarian system has been, you know, a top down vertical approach, and I think we need to change that. It has to be more of a horizontal, has to be more of... something like ASEAN Helping ASEAN. You know, so, it's... It should not be... we should not be given the impression that, you know, the global humanitarian system or the international human immune system, because they already exist for longer, superior than us. Cannot be, right? Because... You know, it's just a like a pyramid. The global humanitarian system brings with them funding, right, brings with them a pool off expertise, brings with them standards, and systems, and these are all good, these are very attractive to us, who are still developing, whose needs are greater than our resources. But, you know, those at the national and local level, you know, we also bring with us our advantages. Let me see the pyramid that I have in my notebook. So we understand the context better, right, we have the ability to adapt and change, and we have this so called acceptability and trust, because we are closer to the ground. So I think, you know, if we understand what actually can be offered also by the national and local actors, I think it will work better, you know, because they are things that can be offered by the global players, but they're also things that can be offered by regional, national and local actors.

Lars Peter Nissen: 33:26

All right, Adelina. So you've very beautifully described how you see the setup for ASEAN, the complementarity that the AHA centre brings to the picture and how that can be an intermediary between the international system and, and national and local capabilities. Now, the question in my mind is, so we have you as a person here, Adelina, with all of your experience, your background, your history, what would happen if we took Adelina and plunked her into the international humanitarian system, into OCHA, or a position in UNICEF HCR or something? And what would happen to the complementarity that you're currently bringing to the system? Would it disappear? Is it because of the institution you represent and the position you hold? Or is it the tradition you have and the culture and the experience you bring to the picture that makes the difference?

Adelina Kamal: 34:24

Okay, that's a very good question, Lars. So, whether I would continue to be the so-called contrarian, whether I would continue to be the so-called collaborative contrarian, right, whether, you know, I would challenge change in the system the way I have done it from outside the system. I think it... First of all, I think it would depend on where I'm going to be put, if I'm in a position that actually could enact change, then perhaps the answer is yes. It has to be in a very strategic position, otherwise, it will be difficult to make a change. Because the system itself is huge. And it's very difficult to make a change from within unless you are at the top. And if we're talking about drastic change, that's going to be disruptive change, normally, it will never happen from within. It's normally driven by external factors. You have seen it. Disrupt change always driven by external factor, you know. In Indonesia, we call it Go-Jek, or like the Uber or like the GRAB, right? Versus taxi, Uber taxi. Or Airbnb versus the hotel industry. Rebellion versus the Empire. That's a Star Wars, right. So it's always externally driven process. And it's going to be difficult to make a change, if we are not in a strategic position. If I'm at the top, the CEO, the number one, I think I will be able to make a change. And I have seen it, you know, in my country and others, but that also requires leadership, yeah. Is a require guts to make a change, because it's not easy to make a change within the already established and huge humanitarian system. I'm not saying that is all bad, no. But I think it is time for us to change. And if we don't change now, then somebody will do it for us. So if human system doesn't change, it's going to be like us riding fossil fueled vehicle 20 years from now, where others are already riding Tesla car, electric cars. Is going to be obsolete. And they will be this alternative approach, those that challenge the status quo, and it's not going to be, you know, the current system anymore is going to be someone else, because the technology will, you know, will replace certain layers, there will there won't be any middlemen. I heard that the Industrial Revolution 5.0 will make us to be more customised, right, personalised, so we can actually reach out to the beneficiaries or the population more directly, just like the cash right now. And that means that in the future we're going to be able to talk to the population directly and that kind of like will challenge the status quo, because the technology will cut layers and middlemen in between. And that actually... this change the alternative will be presented by the private... the individuals and the companies, like the Bill Gates, you know, the foundation, the philanthropists. And they will basically take over the advantages that the global humanitarian system has, that is funding... number one funding right, according to the pyramid, and then also the pool of expertise and the standards and the governance and the system. This... corporates and individuals and the philanthropists, you know, they're coming from companies. So they're used to this concept of efficiency, treating the customer as the king, right Making it better every time continuous improvement. And when their funding gets bigger, then the human test, the current human billing system will not be relevant anymore. So are we going to wait until that actually happen? Are we going to do it now? So that's why... they're not going to discuss with us. you know? It's like Tesla, Elon Musk never discussed with Toyota and BMW and Mercedes right before he decided to make electric cars. So these people, the philanthropists, the companies, the private nuisance, they're not going to discuss this with us, okay, how are we going to do it? And blah, blah, blah? No, they just do doing it themselves. And then they will take over the humanitarian system and then make us irrelevant. Okay. Well, there is... So that's the alternative approach. Are we ready for that alternative. Is going to happen. And many have actually already predicted that. There is this another approach, and I think some are going towards this approach. And I call it the adjustment approach. The adjustment approach is... part of the adjustment approach is the localization approach, right. Basically asking the humanitarian system to change to adapt from a vertical to horizontal approach, asking what actually the mo, right? Whether whether it's going to be staying in in the country for 50 years or 10 years, it's adjustment. It's going to be a more of a slow progress, it's a linear, right, but it's less disruptive. But and it... nobody is going to lose. And I think some actually are trying to adopt that, right, by promoting localization, strengthening governments. And I think we're, you know, in that group as well, the that kind of adjustment approach. But the issue here is that there's less incentive, there's no incentives. There's no incentive for people to actually adopt localization. That's why it never happened, it will never happen, perhaps.

Lars Peter Nissen: 41:45

It's a really interesting way you just put it right. So what I hear you saying is on one side, we have a potential future scenario which is a disruption as we've seen in the tech sector, where more or less market based approach which may be more efficient, but will not be principled properly. And you contrast that with a localised, collaborative, context specific approach rather than a top down one size fits nothing approach coming in from Geneva. I actually hadn't thought of those two futures as the two scenarios. But it's a really, really interesting way to think about.

Adelina Kamal: 42:26

Yeah. So I think that's going to be the future, the future is going to be more inclusive. And I think, if you're not ready, then we have to be ready for this new challenge. It's not going to be only government. So regional organisation, intergovernmental, regional organisation like AHA Centre also need to make sure that we remain relevant, right, in the next decade. But it's not going to be government dominated space anymore when we talk about disaster management or humanitarian assistance. So is going to be more inclusive. And I think I think we also need to be critical to ourselves, you know, on our motives, really? Are we creating reliance or resilience? Are we actually employing a trading mindset or humanitarian mindset. Trading mindset, you know, you pay and then you deploy your experts coming from the country who pay you. That's creating a reliance, or resilience. The thing is that I've been trying to, you know, think about what could be the incentive so people will adopt the adjustment approach, that it will be more interesting for them, rather than the disruptive approach. I think that's something that we need to ponder.

Lars Peter Nissen: 44:06

Exactly. And I think the answer to that... a lot of the answer is in, you cannot have power as centralised as it is, right now. You need to have... we have this model where you have... sort of you would call it the cradle to grave operating model, you get money from the donor, you buy some stuff, you hand it out, and you come back until the donor what you did with it. I think we need to break up that value chain and I think that needs to be a far more complex humanitarian ecosystem, with checks and balances and collaboration being created by very diverse actors. And I think what's holding us back is a very rigid humanitarian architecture with large scale bureaucracies that are too much alike.

Adelina Kamal: 44:49

So right now, I would describe it as a vertical supply-driven egosystem, not even ecosystem, egosystem. Egosystem. So we need to actually shift it to a more, you know, conducive more... what do you call that? Yeah, what you said. Diversified ecosystem.

Lars Peter Nissen: 45:17

Yeah. So exactly. So if we look at an ecosystem, I think there's three things that are characterising an ecosystem. It's that it is diverse (you have different species in it), it is that it is connected (you have parasitic relationships, you have collaborative relationships, you have a food chain), and it is that it's evolving. And that's why it's a nice metaphor, because of those three things. Now, if you evaluate the mainstream system against those criteria, it's not diverse, because if you look at the incentive structure of the mainstream organisation, that's pretty much the same for all of them. So you don't have an ecosystem, you have a herd of elephants. And they're great for some things, but not for everything. Secondly, it's not really connected, because we don't need each other, you get money from the donor, you need the donor. and then you control that money until it's spent and you report back to the donor. And it's about creating a connectedness where there's a need for collaboration with local actors. And that's where I think that inclusiveness you speak from is incredibly important. And that's why it's not really evolving, because we're locked by this herd of elephants who get their share of the pie and then they spent that money.

Adelina Kamal: 46:25

Therefore, people, or the world, needs a contrarian... collaborative contrarian, like AHA Centre, like ASEAN. Many are sceptical about ASEAN, right? I mentioned earlier that many predicted ASEAN to fail. But now we become the second largest, or not second largest, second most successful regional organisation in the world after the EU. And I think that's also due to the fact that we apply this collaborative contrarian. So we... you know, we critically criticise ourself and also criticise the whole ecosystem. We don't go with the mainstream and then just, you know, stop thinking, but we become innovative and, you know, find new ways of doing it. And it's okay! It's okay to be different from the mainstream. If it is for something good. It's a challenge the status quo, yes. But it allows you to be more innovative to actually to be critical to ourself. So I think we need to have more of this collaborative contrarian and I'm not saying, you know, because I want to praise AHA Centre or ASEAN, but I think this is really time for this system to be challenged, but in a positive way. Contrarian doesn't have to be negative, it can be positive, as long as you bring value to the table. You don't basically... you know, you... How can I describe it, let me see. We kind of like emancipate, you know, our self, we liberate ourselves, without having to sideline the others. That's collaboration. But we don't always accept the norms posed on us. Because it may actually not be suitable to our needs. We have to copy paste and modify, not only copy, paste, but also modify, modify to our context and our situation.

Lars Peter Nissen: 48:50

Thank you so much for coming on Trumanitarian and sharing your perspective. I'm acutely aware that you are in Jakarta, it's getting very late. And so I would like to thank you for the time. It's been a great discussion. And thank you for all that you do with the AHA Centre and I look forward to hopefully meeting you soon, again, either in an operation, in Geneva or, who knows, in Jakarta.

Adelina Kamal: 49:12

Thank you, Lars for having me. Is the month of Ramadan, is also a month of reflection and as AHA Centre is entering, you know, a decade, I think it's also good to have this conversation to reflect where we are now, since the first time we met in 2OO8 in Myanmar after cyclone. And so thank you for having me and thank you for this conversation.